The Islamic Republic has been well and truly hammered. So much was evident by its contemptible attempt at retaliation against the United States last night, which was telegraphed in advance to allow Trump to avoid incurring any losses.
The ceasefire, which fell apart before it even took hold, may yet be reinstated. On the other hand, it may collapse entirely. Amid such fast-moving events, it is difficult to predict the immediate future with any certainty. The bigger picture, however, is easier to analyse; hostilities will wind down in the immediate future, likely leaving the pieces roughly where they are right now.
From Israel’s point of view, the lessons of October 7 will not be forgotten. Looking back to October 6, it is difficult to comprehend the existential danger facing the Jewish state, which I’m sorry to say was matched only by the longterm complacency of its leadership.
Hamas was in full power, with its 400-mile tunnel network in pristine condition, its Nukhba force primed and trained, its battalions organised and armed, and its territory booby-trapped. Israel had been lulled into the conviction that Gaze presented no threat. The jihadis, meanwhile, were well-financed, well-supplied and well-prepared.
To the north, meanwhile, Hezbollah was thriving, with an arsenal of up to 120,000, or even 200,000 rockets – more than many nation states – and perhaps 100,000 men. Its elite Radwan Force had drawn up plans for an invasion of Israel’s north that resembled October 7. While Hamas was led by a coterie of fanatical and battle-hardened leaders, not least Yahya Sinwar, Hezbollah was headed by one of the Middle East’s most charismatic terror masterminds, Hassan Nasrallah.
Further afield, the Iranian regime was running rings around Joe Biden, eagerly accepting billions of dollars in sanctions relief while stringing out nuclear negotiations, all the while edging inexorably towards a Bomb. Its more minor proxies, such as the Houthis in Yemen and Kata'ib Hezbollah in Iraq, were in place.
This impending catastrophe for Israel had evolved during Netanyahu’s years in power, under his “National Security Concept”, or “Contzeptiya”. This stemmed from the belief that it was possible to contain and deter the enemy while focussing on development at home, bolstered by diplomatic efforts to advance the Abraham Accords.
For a long time, it seemed to be working. Israel enjoyed the longest period of calm in its history; during the years of Hamas rule behind the fence in Gaza, the Jewish state doubled its GDP and signed unprecedented peace deals with a host of Arab states, not least the United Arab Emirates. The occasional flare-up of trouble was swiftly dealt with by the mighty IDF.
In retrospect, however, it was like a dam holding back an ever-increasing volume of water. At some point, it was destined to break and the people of Israel would be swamped. Thank God Sinwar didn’t manage to coordinate his October 7 atrocities with Iran and Hezbollah (largely due to the fact that Israeli intelligence would have detected any such communication).
And thank God Joe Biden sent American hardware into the region to deter them immediately after the pogroms. That single decision may have saved Israel’s very existence.
The spectre of Iran launching all its ballistic missiles at once, joined by Hezbollah doing the same, Hamas invading from the south and the Houthis targeting Israel to boot does not bear thinking about. But that is the threat that Israelis had been unwittingly living under for years.
After October 7, there will never be a return to that state of affairs. Israel has emerged battered and bloodied but mightier than ever, with international derision matched only by its regional dominance. While the jihadi victory over public opinion is deeply concerning, the military victory achieved by the Jewish state is far more consequential.
Which returns us to the question of Iran. Gone are the days when Israel will turn a blind eye and allow its enemies to slowly build up their forces and capabilities until they reach a critical mass. In the coming months and years, therefore, we may expect to see a combination of two things: negotiated settlements and an expansion of the “campaign between the wars”.
The former is easily understood. In the past, peace deals have only acted as a pause in hostilities at best, and a cover for enemy buildup at worst. In my view, the 2015 Obama nuclear agreement with Iran fell squarely into the second of those categories, but even those better disposed towards it will find it difficult to argue that it did not fall into the former.
In this new era, any deal will mean not just a cessation of hostilities but a cessation of force buildup as well. We have already seen this in the agreement with Hezbollah, which effectively prevented the group from returning to its former power. The same will be true of any impending deal with Iran (unless the Ayatollah is toppled, in which case it may not be necessary).
Such an agreement must be backed up by the second element, the “campaign between the wars”. This was an Israeli doctrine applied mainly in Syria between about 2014 and October 7, and referred to the continued aerial degradation of enemy forces in the country to prevent them from building up.
For years, the Israeli Air Force carried out bombardments several times a week of Iranian, Hezbollah and other troops and assets in Syria and sometimes in Lebanon and elsewhere. This prevented them from gaining a foothold along Israel’s borders and frustrated Tehran’s plans to create a “land bridge” from Iran to Lebanon.
Once any deal has been signed with the Iranians, we can expect Israel to ruthlessly enforce its terms both from the air and via Mossad operations in the country. Now that Jerusalem has done the hard work of destroying Tehran’s air defences and missile stockpiles, not to mention its nuclear programme, it is not about to ease its hold on the Ayatollah’s throat and allow him to rebuild.
Netanyahu’s goal of “total victory” in Gaza is starting to look like a reality across the region. This ain’t October 6 no more.